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ABSTRACT
Chief Judge Rader influences patent jurisprudence in
other nations through his interaction with judges and
lawyers from these jurisdictions. He also uses the
comparative method to gain insights from experiences in
these
jurisdictions
to
improve
U.S.
patent
jurisprudence. This Article discusses opinions authored by
Chief Judge Rader from the comparative law perspective. It
discusses his influence on European and Japanese patent
jurisprudence in the three areas: the (I) patent eligibility,
(II) nonobviousness, and (III) enablement-written
description requirements. Judge Rader likewise used his
knowledge of foreign jurisprudence to interpret U.S. patent
statutes and to develop doctrines in these areas.
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INTRODUCTION
This author met Chief Judge Randall Rader for the first time at
the Association of American Law School (AALS) annual meeting
in Washington, D.C. in 1997. Since then, the judge has been a
great mentor and inspiration for academic research and writing. He
invited me to spend time in his chambers and work with his
fulltime law clerks on cases assigned to him. The experience
working with him gave invaluable insights into reading opinions
and analyzing U.S. case law. Judge Rader has given similar
opportunities not only to U.S. law students, but also to European
and Japanese lawyers who attended the LL.M. programs in which
he teaches as an adjunct professor. He is a frequent speaker for
patent-related seminars and conferences and engages in debates
with European and Japanese judges on issues that parties present in
patent infringement litigation filed in their courts. Just as he is one
of the most influential persons in my academic career, he has made
a substantial impact on the development of professional and
academic careers for key people in the European and Japanese IP
community.
Such influences appear in European and Japanese case law
through opinions and briefs authored by judges and lawyers who
are familiar with U.S. patent jurisprudence. Although courts in
civil law countries, such as Japanese courts, do not have a tradition
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of citing cases, particularly cases from foreign jurisdictions,
European and Japanese judges are open to a well-reasoned
argument regardless of the source. Judges who are exposed to U.S.
ideas through work with Chief Judge Rader or his presentations
may readily find merit in arguments in briefs prepared by U.S.trained lawyers. Such an influence is confirmed by similarity in
discussions and reasoning on important patentability and
infringement issues between opinions authored by European and
Japanese judges and by Chief Judge Rader.
Chief Judge Rader’s knowledge on patent jurisprudence in
foreign countries also brings great benefit to the U.S. patent
community. He uses the comparative law method for analyzing
issues presented to his courts and highlights various features of the
U.S. patent system that contrast with foreign patent systems,
helping U.S. legal professionals develop an in-depth understanding
of patent policies underlying the parties’ disputes from the global
perspective. His openness to ideas from foreign countries and his
effort to develop the best practices for enhancing patent policies
naturally have brought some aspects of U.S. patent system more in
line with the rest of the world.
This Article discusses opinions authored by Chief Judge Rader
from the comparative law perspective. It compares his opinions
with opinions authored by European and Japanese judges and
discusses his influence in European and Japanese patent
jurisprudence and vice versa. This Article focuses on three areas—
the (I) patent eligibility, (II) nonobviousness, and
(III) enablement/written description requirements—in which Judge
Rader used his knowledge on foreign jurisprudence to interpret the
U.S. patent statute and to develop doctrines. This Article also
reviews opinions authored by European and Japanese judges with
respect to Judge Rader’s work in these three areas to discuss his
contribution to comparative patent law.
I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A. The United States
An important issue in patent law is whether an invention fits
within the subject matter that is eligible for a patent. The U.S.
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patent system benefits from Chief Judge Rader’s broad knowledge
of foreign patent systems when it comes to assessing patent
eligibility. It is very rare for U.S. courts, at least in patent cases, to
take account of statutes and jurisprudence of foreign countries.
Chief Judge Rader changed this tradition and used comparative
law to support his views. In In re Bilski, 1 Chief Judge Rader
emphasized the broad scope of patent eligible subject matter under
the U.S. Patent Act in comparison to that of the European Patent
Convention.
Unlike the laws of other nations that include broad
exclusions to eligible subject matter, such as
European restrictions on software and other method
patents . . . and prohibitions against patents deemed
contrary to the public morality . . . U.S. law and
policy have embraced advances without regard to
their subject matter. 2
Chief Judge Rader believes that this broad patent eligibility
gives the U.S. patent system enough flexibility to embrace
unknown fields of inventions and to guarantee incentives for new
innovations, which leads the U.S. to be a top innovation-driven
country in global competition. To maintain this broad eligibility,
he urges limiting exclusions from patent eligibility to three items
expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court: (1) laws of nature; (2)
natural phenomena; and (3) abstract ideas. 3 Nevertheless, he
concluded that the claims at issue in Bilski should be rejected for
lack of eligibility simply because they were directed to an abstract
idea. 4 He explained that the reason why an abstract idea is
excluded from patent eligibility is to adhere to the constitutional
goal of the patent system: “[T]he [Patent] Act intends, as section
101 explains, to provide ‘useful’ technology”; thus, “[a]n abstract
idea must be applied to (transformed into) a practical use before it
qualifies for protection.” 5
1
2
3
4
5

545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1011
Id. at 1013.

2012] JUDGE RADER’S CONTRIBUTION TO COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW

383

Inspired by Judge Rader, Judge Haldane Robert Mayer also
used comparative law to support his view by citing the definition
of statutory invention under the Japanese Patent Act (JPA) and the
Patent Act of the Republic of Korea in his dissenting opinion. 6
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of eligibility, “the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end,” 7 he
argued that the scope of patent eligibility should include only
technological subject matter because “applying laws of nature to
new and useful ends is nothing other than ‘technology’” as these
foreign patent acts define patent eligible inventions. As a result, he
concluded that business methods should be excluded from patent
eligibility.
B. Japan
Contrary to Judge Mayer’s restrictive interpretation of patent
eligibility, the definition of invention under the JPA does not
categorically exclude business methods. The JPA defines a
statutory invention as the highly advanced creation of technical
ideas that utilize a law of nature. 8 The statute requires a highly
advanced level of creation because of the need to distinguish the
subject matter of the patent from that of the utility model, which is
a type of petite patent that requires only a low level of
nonobviousness or inventive step. 9
The key to distinguishing patent-eligible subject matter from
ineligible subject matter under JPA is the utilization or application
of a law of nature. Some Japanese judges interpret “laws of nature”
broadly in the same manner as Chief Judge Rader interprets “an
abstract idea” to include any law or principle that can be applied to
a practical use. They may find a statutory invention with respect to
a business method as long as the method provides a concrete and
useful result regardless of the nature of the practical use.
Such a broad interpretation is highlighted in the phoneme index
6

Id. at 1003.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
8
Japanese Patent Act (JPA), art. 2, para 1.
9
Compare JPA art. 29, para. 2 with Japanese Utility model Act, art. 3,
para. 2.
7
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dictionary case. 10 Reviewing an appeal from the Japan Patent
Office (JPO), Japan’s IP High Court found statutory invention with
respect to a claim for a method of finding words in a bilingual
dictionary. In this case, the court held that the method relied on a
law of nature based on a theory that Japanese-speaking people
generally recognize consonants in English words more easily than
vowels. The claimed method uses this law of nature to help a nonEnglish speaker, such as a native Japanese speaker, to find an
English word in the dictionary by utilizing a unique phoneme
index multi-element matrix. The matrix includes rows consisting
of four elements of a particular English word: (1) a consonant in
the word; (2) the vocal accent and consonants (phonetic symbols);
(3) spelling; and (4) translation. Columns consist of English words
in alphabetical order. Because Japanese people generally recognize
consonants in English words more easily than vowels, they can
find the same combination of consonants in the matrix and look up
the word they are looking for in the dictionary.
The broadest claim does not require a computer or machine,
and thus the method can be implemented manually. The JPO
rejected the claim for lack of statutory invention because it found
that the claim is directed to a mental process or a scheme arbitrary
to the party who set out the scheme. The IP High Court reversed
the JPO’s rejection because it found that the method utilizes a law
of nature to solve a problem. In defining the claimed invention, the
court held that the method solves a problem (i.e. finding an English
word without knowing the spelling of the word) by utilizing the
ability to recognize consonants in English words more easily than
vowels. It found that this ability is a law of nature because the
useful result, finding an English word, is not unique to a particular
individual, but is available to all Japanese users. In other words, a
method that utilizes a law of nature constitutes a statutory
invention if it provides a useful and concrete result. Accordingly,
the interpretation of a law of nature under the JPA adopted by the
phoneme index case is much broader than a narrow definition that
includes only a principle or idea deriving from a scientific theory.
Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High C.] Aug. 26,
2008, Hei 20 (gyō-ke) 10001, Saikō Saibansho Saibanrei Jōhō [Saibanrei Jōhō],
http://www.courts.go.jp. Please note that the party of this case is not disclosed.
10
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It is likely that the interpretation includes a principle deriving from
purely empirical or non-theoretical ideas.
Just as Chief Judge Rader’s policy-oriented, flexible approach
is endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 the IP High Court’s
approach should be supported by Japan’s national policy to
become an IP-based nation. 12 As the U.S. Supreme Court did in
Bilski, Japan’s policymakers have already addressed the need to
make the patent system ready for inventions in the Information
Age. 13 To secure protection for such inventions, the JPA was
revised to clarify that the definition of statutory invention includes
certain computer programs as patent-eligible subject matter.14
Reflecting the same needs and policies, the IP High Court has
adopted a broad interpretation that aligns with Chief Judge Rader’s
approach to patent eligibility by giving courts flexibility to
embrace unknown fields of inventions.
II. OBVIOUSNESS
A. The United States
Another facet of the U.S. patent system that benefits from
Chief Judge Rader’s extensive knowledge of foreign patent
jurisprudence is obviousness. He used this knowledge both to
avoid inappropriate uses of the obviousness analysis and to defend
appropriate uses of it to ensure that patents do not get granted for
unworthy inventions.
In In re Deuel, 15 the Federal Circuit found nonobviousness
with respect to a claim directed to cDNA molecules that encode a
certain protein, heparin-binding growth factors. The prior art did
not suggest the particular molecules, even if the general idea of the
11

Peter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of
Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405 (2012).
12
Ichiro Nakayama & Toshiko Takenaka, Will Intellectual Property Policy
Save Japan from Recessions? Japan’s Basic Intellectual Property Policy and Its
Implementation Through the National Strategic Program, 35 IIC 877 (2004).
13
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
14
JPA, art. 2, para. 3, item 1.
15
51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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claimed cDNA, its function, and its general chemical nature were
obvious from the prior art.16 Deuel led to a special rule for DNA
inventions: DNA is nonobvious over the prior art when the art
includes (1) a disclosure of the amino acid sequence of the protein
that the claimed DNA molecules encode and (2) a disclosure of a
general method for isolating the claimed DNA. 17 The
nonobviousness standard under this special rule is more lenient
than the inventive-step standard that the rest of the world follows
and presents a significant obstacle to USPTO collaboration with
other patent offices for examination of DNA inventions. 18
Keenly aware of the USPTO’s need to harmonize patentability
standards, Chief Judge Rader commented on the serious problem
caused by the lenient nonobviousness standard. In In re Fisher, the
USPTO rejected claims that direct to expressed sequence tags
(“ESTs”) for encoding proteins and protein fragments in maize
plants due to lack of specific utility. 19 The Federal Circuit
endorsed the USPTO’s practice of requiring substantial and
specific utility through its Utility Examination Guidelines. It cited
Brenner v. Manson, 20 highlighting the function of the utility
requirement for eliminating subject matter that does not deserve
the grant of exclusive protection through a patent. 21
Chief Judge Rader dissented because he found that the claimed
express sequence tags have use as a research tool that provides a
benefit to society, thus having required utility. 22 He criticized the
USPTO and the Fisher court’s majority for failing to place the
burden of challenging the utility asserted by the applicant on the
USPTO. In his view, the lenient nonobviousness standard under
Deuel’s special rule for DNA inventions forced the USPTO to
adopt a heightened standard of utility for ESTs. According to Chief
16

Id. at 1558.
Thomas Isenbarger, In re Kubin’s Reinvigorated Nonobviousness
Standard for DNA Patents, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2009).
18
Trilateral Project B3b, Mutual Understanding in Search and
Examination: Comparative Study on Biotechnology Patent Practices,
TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net/projects/biotechnology/mutual.pdf.
19
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20
383 U.S. 519 (1966).
21
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
22
Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting).
17
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Judge Rader, to make up for the marginalized function of the
nonobviousness requirement, the USPTO needs to rely on the
utility requirement for eliminating patent-unworthy DNA
inventions:
In truth, I have some sympathy with the Patent
Office’s dilemma. The Office needs some tool to
reject inventions that may advance the “useful arts”
but not sufficiently to warrant the valuable
exclusive right of a patent. The Patent Office has
seized upon this utility requirement to reject these
research tools as contributing “insubstantially” to
the advance of the useful arts. The utility
requirement is ill suited to that task, however,
because it lacks any standard for assessing the state
of the prior art and the contributions of the claimed
advance. The proper tool for assessing sufficient
contribution to the useful arts is the obviousness
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103. Unfortunately this
court has deprived the Patent Office of the
obviousness requirement for genomic inventions. 23
In urging the Federal Circuit to overrule Deuel, Chief Judge
Rader used comparative law to criticize the special rule:
“Nonetheless, rather than distort the utility test, the Patent Office
should seek ways to apply the correct test, the test used worldwide
for such assessments (other than in the United States), namely
inventive step or obviousness.” 24
Because nonobviousness was not an issue on appeal in Fisher,
Chief Judge Rader had to wait for an opportunity to address the
problem in a case in which nonobviousness of DNA invention was
squarely presented. He found such an opportunity in In re Kubin, 25
where the USPTO rejected DNA molecules for obviousness
despite the lack of the prior art suggesting a particular structure of
the molecules. Like Deuel, the prior art included a disclosure of the
23

Id. at 1381-82 (citing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (Rader,
J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 1382.
25
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

388

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:4

particular amino acid sequence of the protein that the claimed
DNA molecules encode and a disclosure of the method for
isolating the DNA.
Instead of hearing the case en banc and overruling Deuel for
upholding the USPTO’s rejection, Chief Judge Rader relied on
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. to set aside Deuel. 26 He
viewed the Federal Circuit’s application of the nonobviouness
standard in Deuel as inflexible, like the application in KSR, and
thus inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.27 Relying on the
Supreme Court’s criticism of the Federal Circuit’s application of
the “obvious-to-try” doctrine (which cites Deuel), Chief Judge
Rader concluded that “the Supreme Court in KSR unambiguously
discredited that holding [in Deuel].” 28
Nevertheless, he made clear that application of the “obviousto-try” doctrine is proper if the doctrine is applied flexibly on a
case-by-case basis by taking into account the number of choices. 29
The invention is nonobvious if the number of choices is large
enough that a person having ordinary skill in the art of invention
(PHOSITA) would not have arrived at a successful result by trying
out these choices. In applying this flexible obvious-to-try test,
Judge Rader concluded that a PHOSITA would have arrived at the
claimed DNA molecules with a reasonable expectation of success
because a disclosure of the protein motivated the PHOSITA to
isolate the DNA and a method for isolating DNAs was available.
As a result, Chief Judge Rader eliminated the special rule in Deuel
and revitalized the function of the nonobviousness standard, which
harmonized U.S patentability with that of the rest of the world.
Although Chief Judge Rader is eager to admit mistakes made
by his court in KSR and Deuel, he fiercely protects the court’s
practice in which the nonobviousness standard is properly applied.
The nonobviousness standard functions to provide an objective
measure to evaluate the contribution that the claimed subject
matter has made with respect to the state of prior art and to

26

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Kubin, 561 F. 3d at 1359.
28
Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1358.
29
Id.
27
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eliminate subject matter that is unworthy of a patent grant.30 To
enhance this function, the Federal Circuit developed a practice of
applying the teaching-motivation-suggestion test (TSM) in
rejecting or invalidating claims for obviousness. The test requires
an explicit or implicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation from the
prior art, the nature of the problem, or the ordinary knowledge of
those skilled to combine elements of the claimed invention
disclosed in multiple prior art references. 31 The test gives USPTO
examiners and lower-court judges a framework to follow for
obviousness assessments, which leads to objective and predictable
results while protecting the assessments from hindsight.32
However, the TSM test was under fire when the Supreme Court
agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s well-established practice in
response to criticisms from legal commentators that the test made
it too difficult for the USPTO to reject claims directed to patentunworthy subject matter. 33
Chief Judge Rader sought to preserve the TSM test by joining
Judge Paul Redmond Michel, who was then chief judge, to issue
an opinion in Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v.
C.H. Patrick Co. 34 In Dystar, Judge Michel reviewed the Federal
Circuit case law and explained that the TSM test was in fact
applied very flexibly in the cases he had reviewed, observing that
the court took into account common sense and common knowledge
when finding suggestion. 35 The Supreme Court acknowledged
Judge Michel’s effort to clarify the court’s practice and endorsed
the application of the TSM test in nonobviousness assessment so
long as the test is applied flexibly, as Judge Michel explained in
Dystar. 36
30

Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting).
In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
32
Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An
Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J.
369 (2011).
33
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8-15 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
34
464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
35
Id. at 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
36
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743.
31
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In In re Translogic Technology, Inc., 37 Chief Judge Rader
clarified the effect of KSR on the TSM test and used his knowledge
of foreign patent doctrines to comment on how his court made a
mistake in KSR:
On one level, KSR corrected a rather
straightforward error. The error appears right before
footnote 3 in this court’s opinion:
In this case, the Asano patent does not address the
same problem as the ’565 patent. The objective of
the ’565 patent was to design a smaller, less
complex, and less expensive electronic pedal
assembly. The Asano patent, on the other hand, was
directed at solving the ‘constant ratio problem.’
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l, Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282,
288 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This passage overlooks the
fundamental proposition that obvious variants of
prior art references are themselves part of the public
domain. In the context of KSR, the Asano teachings
and its obvious variants were relevant prior art,
even if that patent did address a different problem
(the constant ratio problem). 38
Patent offices and courts in European and Asian countries
developed the notion of obvious variants by enlarging the novelty
standard to eliminate patent-unworthy inventions before a separate
requirement of an inventive step was incorporated. 39 Under their
current systems, some foreign courts take account of obvious
equivalents in making the inventive step assessment.
Chief Judge Rader explained the Supreme Court’s instruction
to take account of common sense and customary knowledge by
analogy to the enlarged novelty inquiry, which takes account of
variations of items disclosed in the prior art if the variants are
37

504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1259 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
39
WIPO International Bureau, Enlarged Concept of Novelty and the Prior
Art Effect of Certain Applications under Draft Article 8(2) of the SPTL (2004)
(draft), http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/novelty/documents/5prov.pdf.
38
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obvious to a PHOSITA. He made clear that the TSM test is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent as long as the test is
applied flexibly by taking into account obvious variants. He further
emphasized the benefit of the test, which is acknowledged by the
Supreme Court: “In any event, as the Supreme Court suggests, a
flexible approach to the TSM test prevents hindsight and focuses
on evidence before the time of invention, without unduly
constraining the breadth of knowledge available to one of ordinary
skill in the art during the obviousness analysis.” 40
Because of Chief Judge Rader’s clarification of the Court’s
instruction, the TSM test continues to play a vital role in
nonobviousness assessment under the post-KSR Federal Circuit
case law. 41
B. Japan
In contrast to the Federal Circuit’s TSM test, Japan’s IP High
Court’s inventive step test came under fire for its stringent
standard—legal commentators criticized it for often resulting in
invalidity of patent filings due to lack of an inventive step. 42
According to JPO Examination Guidelines, examiners can find a
motivation to combine multiple references if the art of reference is
analogous to the art of invention. This requires similarity of field
of endeavor or the problem between the invention and the
references. 43 This practice allows JPO examiners to find a
40

Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1260
See, e.g., Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc, 655 F.3d 1352, 1361 (“This
court has observed that teachings from prior art, suggestions beyond the literal
teachings of those art references, or even motivations from the store of common
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art field (“TSM”)—flexibly viewed
and applied—provide the sources of evidence that an ordinary skilled artisan
might have found and combined at the time of the invention.”); Ortho-McNeil
Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] flexible
TSM test remains the primary guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight
analysis . . . .”).
42
Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, IAA, Shigeo Takakura,
Review of the Recent Trend in Patent Litigation from the Viewpoint of
Innovation, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0242.html (last visited Apr.
13).
43
Japan Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model
41
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motivation very easily and to reject claims for lack of an inventive
step.
In comparison, under Federal Circuit case law, the USPTO can
only cite a prior art reference from the analogous art.44 In In re
Rouffet, Chief Judge Rader made clear that a motivation to select
and combine multiple references cannot be presumed simply
because the references are analogous to the art of invention. 45 Even
if the problem or field of endeavor of references is similar to those
of the claimed invention, USPTO examiners must identify a
teaching from the references giving rise to a motivation. USPTO
examiners can rely on the nature of a problem: the PHOSITA’s
common knowledge to find a suggestion or motivation to combine
references. If they rely on the knowledge of the PHOSITA, they
must explain the specific understanding or principle within the
knowledge that would motivate the PHOSITA to conceive a
combination of elements as described in the claim. Without an
explanation, it is likely that the examiners used hindsight to select
the claimed combination, 46 as Chief Judge Rader correctly pointed
out in Monarch Knitting Machine Corp v. Sulzer Morat GmbH. 47
Thus, USPTO examiners must explain a specific understanding if a
suggestion comes from the nature of the problem because
otherwise the USPTO and courts may formulate a problem in
terms of the solution adopted by the inventor, thus relying
improperly on the assistance of hindsight.
To respond to criticisms from the legal community, Japan’s IP
High Court adopted a test similar to the TSM test to guard against
hindsight bias. In Hitachi Kasei v. Commissioner of Japan Patent
Office, 48 the court reversed the JPO’s rejection for lack of
inventive step by using a general framework for making an
assessment of an inventive step:
in Japan, pt. II, ch. 2, 2.5(2), http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/
Guidelines/2_2.pdf.
44
In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Clay, 966 F.2d
656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
45
In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1355.
46
Id. at 1358.
47
139 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
48
Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.], January 28,
2009, Hanrei Jiho [Hanji] No. 2043, 117, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 1299, 272.
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Whether a PHOSITA would have readily conceived
the claimed invention on basis of the prior art must
be decided by addressing a question whether a
PHOSITA started from the prior art and would have
readily arrived at the characterized elements
(elements which are different from elements
disclosed in prior art references). The characterized
elements are those which are essential for solving
the problem of the invention. It is necessary to
define the characterized elements, and thus the
technical problem to be solved by the invention for
making an objective assessment of inventive step
whether a PHOSITA would have readily conceived
the invention. It is also necessary to avoid hindsight
or illogical analysis throughout this assessment. To
avoid hindsight, one should not formulate
unconsciously “the technical problem” of the
invention should in terms of “the solution” or “the
result from the solution.” 49
The IP High Court further commented on a requirement of
suggestion in the prior art:
To conclude that the claimed invention does not
involve inventive step, it is not sufficient that the
prior art indicates a possibility that a PHOSITA
could have made attempts to arrive at the essential
elements of the claimed invention. The prior art
must include a suggestion that a PHOSITA would
have arrived at the essential elements. 50
In INAX v. Commissioner of Japan Patent Office, 51 the IP High
Court refined this framework for a combination invention
consisting of elements from multiple references by requiring a
specific understanding, as Chief Judge Rader required in Rouffet.
49

Id. Hanji at 126.
Id.
51
Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May. 27,
2010, Hei 21 (gyō-ke) 10361, Saikō Saibansho Saibanrei Jōhō [Saibanrei Jōhō],
http://www.courts.go.jp./hanrei/pdf/20100706093218.pdf.
50
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After remaking the relatively simple structure of the claimed
invention, the court commented on a risk of hindsight particularly
associated with combination inventions: “[I]t is easy to lead to a
conclusion that a PHOSTA readily adopt the solution of the
invention once the problem of the invention is made clear.” 52 To
avoid the risk, the court required JPO examiners to follow an
analytical framework which consists of (1) a step of identifying the
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art, and
(2) a step of using a specific analytical process (understanding the
significance of characterized elements in context of the technical
problem and the solution for the problem while supplementing
teachings from the prior art to determine whether a PHOSITA
would have conceived the characterized elements). Unless the
examiners can give an explanation for reaching their conclusion by
following the specific analytical process, their conclusion of lack
of an inventive step is improper. In INAX, the court found that the
JPO did not make clear that it followed the analytical process
because the JPO did not give an explanation for why a PHOSITA
would have conceived the characterized elements by combining
the references. Relying on this conclusion, the court revised the
JPO’s decision.
In short, a test similar to the TSM is used by the IP High Court
to make an objective assessment of an inventive step. By requiring
an explanation with respect to a specific understanding or principle
of how a PHOSITA would have reached the claimed invention, the
IP High Court’s inventive-step assessment and the Federal
Circuit’s nonobviousness assessment are protected from a risk of
hindsight.
To maintain flexibility, both courts can take account of
PHOSITA’s common sense and customary knowledge to explain
the specific understanding or principle. This flexible application of
the TSM test strikes a fine balance between two competing
policies—providing a safeguard against hindsight and eliminating
patent-unworthy inventions—as well as creates full harmony
between the inventive step and nonobvious standards under
Japanese and U.S. patent laws.
52

Id.
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III. ENABLEMENT AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
A. The United States
Another critical facet of patent law is the enablement of the
invention and the written description of the invention in the patent
application. In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,53
Chief Judge Rader was unsuccessful at convincing his colleagues
to overrule Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly &
Co. 54 and a series of precedents following Lilly in which the
Federal Circuit, he believed, inappropriately applied the written
description requirement to original claims. He argued that these
cases made the written description requirement redundant with the
enablement requirement if it applies to original claims in service of
the same policy: policing the claim scope in contrast to the scope
of disclosure.
If 35 U.S.C. § 112 is compared with the written description and
enablement requirements under the European Patent Convention
(EPC) and JPA, his arguments make sense. Ariad relates to claims
directing a method for regulating gene expression by a
transcription factor called NF-[K]B, which may cause harmful
symptoms. The majority found that the disclosure of the allegedly
infringed patent was invalid for lack of an adequate written
description because the disclosure did not disclose a method for
regulating the factor, and thus did not support that the inventors
possessed the claimed method on the effective filing date.55
In his dissenting opinion jointly authored with Judge Richard
Linn, Chief Judge Rader argued that Lilly created a new written
description doctrine that has no support in the patent statute and is
inconsistent with the court’s pre-Lilly precedent, in which the
written description requirement functioned solely for policing the
priority and thus applied to new claims that were not part of the
original disclosure. He was particularly concerned with the impact

53

598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
55
Id. at 1568.
54
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resulting from the new doctrine upon a fine balance provided in the
U.S. Constitution:
The Constitution of the United States gives
Congress, not the courts, the power to promote the
progress of the useful arts by securing exclusive
rights to inventors for limited times. Art. I, § 8, cl.
8. Yet this court proclaims itself the body
responsible for achieving the “right balance”
between upstream and downstream innovation.
Ante at 28. The Patent Act, however, has already
established the balance by requiring that a patent
application contain “a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.” 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). In rejecting
that statutory balance in favor of an undefined
“written description” doctrine, this court ignores the
problems of standardless decision making and
serious conflicts with other areas of patent law. 56
Chief Judge Rader believes the new written description
doctrine is redundant with the enablement requirement, serving the
same policy of preventing inventors from claiming inventions that
they did not invent, and thus failed to possess at the time of filing.
In his view, a disclosure that is sufficient to meet the enablement
requirement necessarily meets the requirement under the new
doctrine for fully supporting a claim and showing the possession of
the claimed invention by disclosing how to make and use the
invention. 57 According to Judge Rader, the new doctrine is not
only unnecessary but also harmful because the test of the new
doctrine is not well defined and is therefore difficult for courts and
applicants to apply. 58
Moreover, the new doctrine is in tension with an important rule
56

Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 980-81.
58
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1364 (Rader, J., dissenting).
57
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for claim interpretation. If claims are interpreted in light of the
disclosure in the specification according to the rule that the en banc
Federal Circuit adopted in Phillips, the claims should correspond
with the scope of disclosure so that the disclosure fully supports
the claims. 59 The new doctrine is also in tension with a rule that a
patent owner of an improvement may infringe a patent of a basic
invention on which the improvement is based. 60 It follows that an
inventor of a basic invention is entitled to the scope covering any
improvements that were nonobvious at the filing of the
improvement patent and were not in the inventor’s possession at
the filing of the basic patent. Chief Judge Rader is concerned that
the new doctrine invalidates claims that were issued to cover a
genus, including species and improvements which can be
separately patentable, and that were not in the inventor’s
possession at the filing date of the genus claim patent, effectively
eliminating blocking patents.
B. Europe
European and Japanese judges face a similar challenge of
distinguishing the enablement requirement and the written
description requirement and finding a compromise between
policies
underlying
the
enablement-written
description
requirements and claim interpretation. The EPC codifies the
enablement requirement and the written description in separate
sections. 61 Unlike the U.S. Patent Act, where both requirements
are directed to the sufficiency of disclosure in the specification, the
EPC’s written description is directed to the sufficiency of claims.
In contract, the enablement requirement is directed to the
sufficiency of disclosure in the specification. Another important
difference between the U.S. Patent Act and the EPC is that a
59

Id. at 1365.
Id.
61
European Patent Convention (EPC) art. 83 requires patent application
describing the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be
carried out by a PHOSITA (the enablement requirement). EPC art. 84 requires
the claims to be clear and concise and be supported by the description (the
written-description requirement).
60
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violation of the enablement requirement under the EPC is grounds
for rejection during the pre-grant examination as well as grounds
for revocation during the post-grant opposition, while the written
description requirement is grounds for rejection during the pregrant examination only. 62 Thus, these requirements are not
completely redundant.
EPC member states incorporated these requirements into their
national patent laws as provided by the EPC. Thus, U.K. Patents
Act 1977 (UKPA) copied the terms of these requirements under
the EPC and provides sufficiency requirements for the disclosure
and claims. 63 Reflecting the grounds for post grant opposition
under the EPC, the UKPA provides only the enablement
requirement as a ground for invalidating U.K. patents.64 U.K.
judges seem puzzled about why only one of the two requirements
is a ground for invalidation. These requirements appear to serve
the same policy and are seemingly redundant. Lord Oliver of
U.K.’s highest court, the House of Lords, confirmed this view:
The Act does not contain any definition of the word
“supported” but some assistance can be obtained
from the provisions of section 14(5) which require
the claim in an application to be “supported” by the
description. That must, I think, involve the
conclusion that if that which is contained in the
description of the specification does not enable the
claim to be established, it cannot be said to
“support” it, for the Act can hardly have
contemplated a complete application for a patent
lacking some of the material necessary to sustain
the claims made. 65
In Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc, Lord Hoffmann from U.K.’s
62

EPC art. 100.
Patents Act 1977 (UKPA) § 14(3) requires the specification of an
application to disclose the invention in a manner that is clear enough and
complete enough for the invention to be performed by a PHOSITA (the
enablement requirement). UKPA § 14(5)(c) requires the claim or claims to be
supported by the description (the written-description requirement).
64
UKPA § 72.
65
Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485.
63
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House of Lords agreed with Lord Oliver that the two requirements
are redundant and therefore only one of them, the enablement
requirement, is listed as a ground for invalidation under the
UKPA. 66
In contrast, both requirements are grounds for invalidation
under the U.S. Patent Act, despite Judge Rader’s conclusion that
these requirements are completely redundant. Enablement has a
long history of serving the policy of policing the claim scope and
establishing a predictable test. If the Federal Circuit finds it
necessary to tighten the policy, the court should use the
enablement requirement instead of the written description
requirement.
European judges also agree with Judge Rader that there is a
tension between the enablement-written description requirements
and the claim interpretation and the blocking patent doctrines. In
Generics Limited v. H. Lundbech A/S, 67 Lord Walker further
reinforced the view that the two requirements are redundant by
citing Exxon/Fuel Oils, in which the enlarged board of the
European Patent Office interpreted the enablement and written
description provisions under the EPC:
Furthermore, Article 84 EPC also requires that the
claims must be supported by the description, in
other words it is the definition of the invention in
the claims that needs support. In the Board’s
judgment, this requirement reflects the general legal
principle that the extent of the patent monopoly, as
defined by the claims, should correspond to the
technical contribution to the art in order for it to be
supported, or justified . . . .68
Like Chief Judge Rader, Lord Walker has commented on the
interaction between the enablement-written description
requirements and the claim interpretation and blocking patent
doctrines and tries to justify the scope of a patent that includes
subject matter that is not sufficiently disclosed to enable a
66

Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc [1997] R.P.C. 1.
Generics Ltd. v. H. Lundbech A/S, [2009] UKHL 12.
68
T 0409/91, OJ EPO 1994, 653 (“Fuel oils/EXXON”).
67
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PHOSITA to carry out the subject matter without undue burden. 69
Relying on the above comment in Exxon, he concluded that claims
and disclosure meet the enablement and written description
requirements as long as the scope corresponds to the technical
contribution. As described in Generics, in chemical and
biotechnological fields, a claim frequently directs to an
improvement of early compounds and DNAs that is covered by a
claim in an earlier application, which Chief Judge Rader identified
as the blocking conditions occurring in Ariad. 70
Lord Walker affirmed the Court of Appeals’ finding that the
claim for the (+) enantiomer of the known anti-depressant is valid.
The scope of the claim should extend to any (+) enantiomer of the
product regardless of the method for making the enantiomer
without violating the enablement and written description
requirement, even if many of these methods are not being enabled
or supported by the disclosure of the patent. Because the court
found that the technical contribution of the claimed invention is to
produce the (+) enantiomer, the scope should not be limited by a
method of making the enantiomer. In other words, under the
UKPA, a blocking condition occurs with respect to species and
improvements that the patentee did not enable or possess if the
improvements are within the technical contribution.
In contrast, the Ariad majority’s rigid application of the
possession test may eliminate all blocking conditions, which will
encourage knowledge exchange through cross-licensing between
upstream and downstream patent owners and expose basic patents
on genus chemical compounds and DNAs to the challenge of
invalidity for a violation of the written description requirement. 71
European judges would have agreed with Chief Judge Rader that
an objective standard is necessary for upholding a blocking patent
even if the disclosure does not support the inventor’s possession of
species and improvements which fall within the scope of the
blocking patent.

69

Generics Ltd. at ¶¶ 37-38.
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 1366 (Rader, J., dissenting).
70
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C. Japan
Japanese judges would likely agree with Chief Judge Rader’s
assertion that the enablement and written description requirements
should not be redundant in serving the same policy. The JPA’s
written description and enablement requirements mirror these
requirements under the EPC.72 A major difference from the EPC is
that the JPA makes clear that both requirements are grounds for
revocation after patent issuance. 73 Thus, Lord Hoffmann’s
justification for having redundant requirements does not apply to
the requirements under the JPA. Therefore, like Judge Rader,
Japanese judges try to distinguish the enablement requirement
from the written-description requirement.
In Boehringer Ingelheim v. Commissioner of Japan Patent
Office, 74 the JPO rejected a claim that directed to the use of
flibanserin to treat sexual disorders due to a failure to meet the
written-description requirement. The JPO explained that the claim
did not direct to an invention described in the specification because
the disclosure did not include a description of the pharmacological
data or its equivalent to establish the utility of the claimed
compound for treating sexual disorders. On appeal, the IP High
Court revised the JPO’s decision for erroneously relying on the
written-description requirement. The Court distinguished the
policy underlying the written description requirement from that of
the enablement requirement.
Article 36, Paragraph 4, Item 1, requires “a detailed
explanation of the invention,” that includes the
“necessary data to allow a person ordinarily skilled
in the art who may try to understand the invention
72

JPA art. 36, para. 4 requires a detailed explanation of the invention,
including a description of invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete
for the invention to be worked by a PHOSITA (the enablement requirement).
JPA art. 36, para. 6, item 1 requires a claimed invention being included in the
written description of the specification (the written description requirement).
73
JPA art. 123, para. 1, item 4.
74
Judgment of the IP High Court of Japan, Jan. 22, 2010, Hanrei Jiho
[Hanji] No. 2073, 105. English translation of the case by the author is available
in ADELMAN ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PATENT LAW 172 (2011).
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to understand the relevant technical problems and
how to solve them, and be able to understand the
technical significance of the invention.” . . . The
purpose of this provision is to create a patent system
that grants a monopoly right for a set period of time
to inventors who publically disclose their invention
as compensation for that disclosure.
In contrast, Article 36, Paragraph 6, Item 1 requires
that the “claim” include “a detailed description of
the invention for which a patent is sought.” . . . If
the scope of “claim” exceeds the scope of technical
information described and disclosed in the “detailed
explanation of the invention,” a grant of an
exclusive right to such claims conflicts with the
purpose of a patent system where an exclusive right
is granted only to the extent of the scope of
disclosure because a patent is granted as
compensation for that disclosure. Thus, Article 36,
Paragraph 6, Item 1 does not allow the inclusion of
claims that exceed the scope of disclosure. For
example, if the “embodiments” description only
allows for a limited and narrow understanding of
the technical aspects of the invention, while the
“claims” description goes beyond the technical
description encompassing a much wider technical
scope, the claims will be in conflict with Article 36,
Paragraph 6, Item 1, and should not be allowed. 75
In short, the enablement requirement relates to the policy for
making sure that a PHOSITA understands the invention
sufficiently to carry out the invention, whereas the writtendescription requirement relates to the policy of ensuring that the
scope of exclusive right corresponds to the scope of disclosure. To
reject a claim for a violation of the written-description
requirement, the JPO must compare the scope of the claim and the
scope of disclosure. Because the JPO’s rejection did not determine
75

Id.; ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 172-73.
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whether the claim scope exceeded the scope of disclosure, the IP
High Court concluded that the JPO erroneously relied on the
written-description requirement for rejecting the claim.
Japanese judges appear to share the same concern that Chief
Judge Rader and Judge Linn indicated in Ariad: the claims at issue
should have been rejected for lack of enablement instead of the
written-description requirement. 76 Like Boehringer Ingelheim, the
invalidity arguments in Lilly do not compare the claim scope with
the scope of disclosure. Instead, the arguments focused on whether
the disclosure in the Ariad patent includes a method of regulating
the transcription factor.77 By failing to include any method for
performing the regulation, the disclosure does not provide enough
information to make and use the claimed invention. Because any
claim scope is enabled, the proper ground for invalidating the
claim should the enablement requirement. By allowing the writtendescription requirement to invalidate non-enabled claims, the
majority marginalized the function of the enablement requirement
as done by the JPO in Boehringer Ingelheim.
CONCLUSION
As the author of another article in this festschrift correctly
points out, Chief Judge Rader uses a wide range of analytical
methodologies and looks beyond traditional legal authorities in
developing patent jurisprudence. 78 The comparative law method is
one such methodology that he uses to interpret the statutory terms
and develop new doctrines. The U.S. opinions, as well as the
European and Japanese decisions influenced by Chief Judge
Rader’s work, reviewed in this Article are merely examples of his
jurisprudence, highlighting his knowledge of foreign patent laws
and his influence on European and Japanese judges. Through his
openness to foreign patent law and eagerness to share his
experiences with foreign judges, Chief Judge Rader stimulates
academic discussions of U.S. patent jurisprudence in the context of
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Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1372 (Linn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1354.
78
See Lee, supra note 8, at 418.
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comparative law and greatly contributes to the harmonization of
patent systems.

